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To make sure I understand everything, it seems that there are several discussions going on here: 1) What differentiates humans from robots (and plants and animals)? 2) What differentiates robots from plants (or viruses, etc.)?

Could you clarify your answers to these questions? Why isn't a rock alive/human? Why isn't a tree human?

I didn't answer any question. But brought some criteria to help think about the answers.

But you did answer some of them.

That the idea a robot is alive is absurd. But what if a robot like T-850 really existed? The idea a robot is alive is still absurd?

According to the movie, it fulfills both of the criteria I cited above.

But as regards T-850, I don't really know what is going on, but from what I read on wikipedia, there is a robot that has living tissue surrounding it right? In that case, it would be sort of like moss growing on a rock. The rock isn't alive, but the moss on the rock is. Or were you referring to another aspect of T-850?

Didn't you watch Terminator 2: Judgment Day? Now I'm feeling old.

This movie is (was?) iconic, specially when you are talking about technological singularity.

I think it's more along the lines of: yeah, it's easy to just say "it's absurd" when comparing Java code to a human being. But it wouldn't be so easy to brush off as obvious with an uber-advanced cyborg that looks and acts human to the point you can't tell the difference. At that point, you need to really break it down with some logical arguments as to what defines life or consciousness.

Good points. I'd also like to add that people anthropomorphize (take that, Google) almost everything we see. People see the Terminator as "alive" to some degree simply because it walks and talks like a human. We almost certainly see it as more "alive" on a subconscious level than a supercomputer many times more intelligent just because it can speak.

well, no, I don't think so. There's a difference between a) grasping intellectually that something is a robot and claiming that the logical distinction between robots and living substances corresponds to a real distinction and b) seeing the robot and having difficulty recognizing it as a robot rather than a human.

Please clarify.

Hmm. So the terminology is from formal logic. What I'm trying to say is basically, once I know that T-850 is a robot, I can easily distinguish it from a human, at least at the level of thought. In this case, I would argue that the distinction in thought corresponds to a distinction in reality. However, I may not be able to come to a correct understanding of what T-850 is. This, however, does not change the argument, because then I lack a correct understanding of what I am classifying.

Ignore the organic covering.

At the end of the movie, the character was even learning about human values and started overriding it's own programming in order to protect mankind. A robot with free will and morality.

Ignoring the organic covering, I would say it's definitely not alive. (at least for now, I am quite happy using the negative entropy test for something being alive)

Since it's not alive, it's not human. :)

But since you brought it up, I would also mention that there are qualitative differences between humans' intellects and computers' precessing power. A computer is basically a bunch of rocks (or tinker toys (http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/472_html/Intro/TinkertoyComputer/TinkerToy.html)) arranged in a particular way. You can have them find 2^10 but they don't have an UNDERSTANDING of 2 or 10. (Using more terminology from formal logic: They lack the ability to abstract particulars to form universals; they can't have simple comprehensions.)

It doesn't need to be organic to fulfill negentropy. That's why this definition is meaningful on a robot discussion.

Also, the movie makes it quite clear the machines (from the future) are on their own.

And also made it quite clear they are sentient due to some chip designed in a way humans never thought about, until they scavenged one from a terminator.

If we use negentropy to define life, by definition, if it fulfils negentropy, it is organic. (according to Google's dictionary anyways, Merriam Webster suggests some other definitions, but I think they would come to the same thing)

So though I don't don't necessarily accept the negentropy criteria as a satisfactory definition, but for the time being, I'll work with it.

As regards the last two points, remember, I never saw the movie.

Could you explain how the machines being on their own is significant?

What I'm saying is that you can't arrange a bunch of rocks in such a way that they are sentient. Movies can be made where vegetables can talk, but that doesn't mean it can really happen.

We know extremely little about how consciousness physically works. While it is intuitively hard to believe, it is possible that any sufficiently intelligent system could be conscious, even if it is made of rocks (or tennis balls).

I see no reason why plants couldn't eventually develop some form of communication if their environment required it.

I was taught in school organic substances were those composed mostly of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen.

The machines being on their own and still surviving is a sign of negative entropy.

Using sentience as criterion is problematic because it can't be tested. But I had to bring it here because the discussion was already heading towards philosophy.

Negentropy, on the other side, is a much more concrete criterion, and the broadest definition of life I know of. We could stick to the classic cell criterion, but then it would be too easy to answer the question which started the whole discussion with a no.

I wouldn't use sentience since I consider plants to be alive. As regards negentropy, I didn't research this very much, but I couldn't see exactly how they decide where to define the system as closed. Could you try to explain that to me please?

I should have specified that that response was for sheldor.

I can say with confidence that a rock isn't alive because it displays no signs of negentropy, intelligence, or any physical or informational changes that aren't directly caused by an external source.

A tree is not human because, well, it is in another taxonomic kingdom. :)

Robot's display no signs of negentropy.

A tree is in another taxonomic kingdom BECAUSE it is not human. But how do you know that? (Hint: universals.)

You're right, my point about taxonomy was really circular logic. It was intended as a joke.

Well just because it was a joke doesn't mean I don't still want an answer. :)

A tree isn't human because there are enough significant physical differences to justify two different names/taxonomic categories. That should have been obvious to you. I don't think we mean exactly the same things when we say "human."

I think that when you say "human," you mean more than just the species Homo Sapiens, you also include the concepts of mind and soul. I think you believe that humans are special, or fundamentally different from other animals.

I don't believe Homo Sapiens are really that special when compared to other animals. We are not the only creatures that have developed tools or language. We are not the only creatures to feel emotions or pain, or to be "aware" of our surroundings. Insect societies are fundamentally not too far different from ours. Dogs and pigs are more intelligent than human infants. Butterflies see the world in colors we can't even imagine.

Our greatest claim to being superior to other animals is probably our accomplishments in the STEM fields. But, in that we are quickly being overtaken by machines.

To me, it seems intuitively clear (read: I'm not claiming I can provide a logical proof) that humans are on the other side of an important threshold of intelligence as compared to most or all other animals on earth. And including machines in the discussion seems premature. For all we know, the ability to attain consciousness is related to the materials that form our brains and anything silicon-based is incapable of consciousness.

But even so, I agree we aren't special in any absolute sense. I don't see why chimps or dolphins couldn't evolve to cross that intelligence threshold, if it exists. And despite our remarkable ability to understand abstract concepts, I take it as a given that there are limits to our ability to understand the universe, much as a cat can never understand how a DVD player works the way that we can.

I thought dolphins and mice already had become intelligent. :)

I didn't say that machines were conscious, only that they are very quickly becoming much better at using mathematics and may soon be better than humans at STEM related tasks.

I meant crossing the intelligence threshold that humans have crossed, not just having any degree of intelligence. I'm not sure how to clearly define it. But I think mice would have trouble understanding this discussion. :-) Understanding theory of mind is one important threshold. I think humans have crossed another important threshold (or more than one) in terms of understanding abstract concepts, even compared to chimps and dolphins.

Also I think consciousness is very relevant to claiming machines are "using mathematics". Unless the machine itself becomes conscious, we are using machines to do mathematics. The machine is just a physical structure and reaction, like a crystal lattice. You wouldn't claim a crystal lattice is intelligent or using math, just because we can use math to describe interesting aspects of its structure, would you?

I don't think you understood the joke. It was a vague reference to The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy.

Your point about machines not being aware that they are using math reminds me of the Chinese room. Do you agree with it?

I'll get back to you regarding the Chinese room once I have done more research on it, but I want to return to the discussion of classification of trees and humans again. You can distinguish between trees and humans based on their appearance. Do all trees share something that makes them trees?(Aristotelian form.) Do you have an understanding of what a tree is?

When I say human I mean a rational, sentient, living, material, substance. I'm not a materialist (as I said before, I follow the Scholastic school of thought), but you can't successfully argue against my stance by saying that you have a different idea (which is immaterial) of what a human is. I'm not asking what you think I think a human is, I'm asking what you think a human is.

"I don't believe Homo Sapiens are really that special when compared to other animals. We are not the only creatures that have developed tools or language. We are not the only creatures to feel emotions or pain, or to be "aware" of our surroundings. Insect societies are funduamentally not too far different from ours. Dogs and pigs are more intelligent than human infants. Butterflies see the world in colors we can't even imagine. "

You're completely missing the point. I'm saying that we aren't distinguished from other animals based on these things, so what do you use to distinguish us?

As regards STEM, I'm not an artistic person and I'm not saying art is more IMPORTANT than other things, but it seems to be a difference between humans and other animals. Can you explain why we have art museums and no other animal does?

Our brains are closely related to consciousness, but they are not necessarily the same thing. And knowing if anything silicon-based is capable of consciousness or not leads to the mind-body problem.

While I agree with Voidious that we don't know enough about our brains to say for sure, I personally speculate that a very powerful supercomputer running very smart software could think like us. I guess that makes me a physicalist.

A normal computer with very smart software could think like us. A supercomputer only provides speed.

@Chase-san
Really? The human brain has over two petabytes of long-term memory.[1] Does your computer have a hard drive that size?

@Voidious
You seem to imply a difference between a conscious being deciding to use math and a computer receiving instructions and giving outputs. But, if consciousness is deterministic, is there really any difference between a conscious being receiving inputs (from its senses) and deciding to use math, and a machine receiving inputs (indirectly from conscious beings) and deciding to use math?

You have said that you believe humans are mostly deterministic. There are also many instances of people behaving deterministically. Among them are, as I've noted before, people who have transient global amnesia.

If we are purely deterministic, then no, there's no difference. Math only exists in our minds, so to me, if there's no consciousness, there's no math.

I didn't say we aren't conscious. I said that our consciousness is deterministic, i.e. we give the same outputs when we receive the same inputs. We are just a "physical structure and reaction."

I'd still like to know what you think about the Chinese room thought experiment. It seems very relevant to our discussion.

Why do you assume that we are deterministic? Don't you think it at least seems like we make choices?

That still isn't a supercomputer, that is just a storage network. But if I recall the storage capacity of the human brain is still in dispute. Some say its incredibly vast (like you did just now), others claim it is just better at storing the information. I am more in the second camp.

It isn't compression exactly. I would say it is more of useless information is discarded, and useful information is only partially stored. Say I may learn something, but if I never use it, i'll forget its meaning. Meaning my brain got rid that useless information because it was never used. Studies show we forget up to 75% of what we learn on a daily basis. Of course if it got used a lot at some point it will stay in there for future use, though the exact details will get fuzzy with disuse.

It will go from "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dogs." to "fox jumped over dogs" to "fox (general notion of going over) dog". That makes no sense, so fox... oh, over the dog. What can we use to go over a dog. Well we could jump, or we could hover, fly. But a fox cannot hover or fly, so it was probably jump. So we reconstruct it to be "the fox jumped over the dog." Information was lost, but the general meaning remained.

To further enforce this, I had forgot part of the original saying above. I had lost 'quick'. But then I remembered that oh, its one of those sentences that uses all the letters. I noticed it didn't have a 'q' in it. So I suddenly recalled, oh, "Quick". Well the dog isn't quick, I don't think it quickly jumped, so the fox must be the one who was quick, as most foxes are.

Okay, so a normal personal computer, with extremely large memory and much more storage, running very smart software could be conscious.

But, why bother? What's so great about consciousness? Really, the only advantage brains have over computers is their ability to recognize patterns.